Paul Rogers for Open Democracy Guardian
Comment Network 6 Dec.
2012
The situation in Syria is
dire. After 20 months of conflict, the war has created a human and economic
disaster. Around 40,000 people have been killed, many more injured and hundreds
of thousands displaced. All this, now reinforced by concern over
Syria's chemical weapons, is creating an upsurge in support for western
military intervention, on the grounds that the moment could become the
"tipping-point" for Bashar al-Assad's regime.
There is a clear need
to assess the risks and probable consequences of such a course, and to examine
the prospects for a diplomatic solution. The context for both is the way the
Syrian conflict has evolved. Syria's power-elite drew
from Tunisia and Egypt the lesson that it had to be ruthless in its repression
and offer little in the way of concession. But ever more force only hardened
the opposition, and by mid-2012 a rebellion was
developing.
The conflict was evolving
rapidly into a form of "double-proxy" war that, by involving regional
and global actors, hugely complicated the search for a peaceful resolution. In
the Middle East, the rebels were increasingly encouraged by
Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The Assad regime was
strongly backed by Iran; weapons and training resources flowed in, greatly
aided by an "air bridge" that transited Iraq (thanks to Nouri
al-Maliki's government in Baghdad, in an act dismaying to
the United States.)
.
Washington and its
allies were on the side of the rebels, while the Russians and to an extent the
Chinese stood by Damascus. A further complication was the growing presence of
Islamist paramilitaries, many of them travelling from elsewhere in the region.
They proved particularly effective thanks to their intense commitment and
motivation, but also because some had gained combat
experience in urban warfare in Iraq.
A new momentum So far, western powers
have confined themselves to channelling aid to "acceptable" rebels
while trying to prevent Islamist groups from acquiring weaponry. An extension
of this stance might initially take the form of supplying the rebels with more
effective arms and erecting a "no-fly zone". Both are feasible
short-term actions, although the latter could be made more difficult by the
presence of 2,000 Russian advisers in Syria.
The supporters of
intervention have two cogent arguments: that an even worse humanitarian
disaster must be prevented, and that a quick end to Assad's regime will
diminish the risk of Islamist influence in
a post-Assad Syria. They point to the evident increase in the number of
Islamist-linked paramilitaries active in
the conflict, with the Jabhat al-Nusra group alone claiming 10,000 fighters. In
parallel, the tactics of many rebels have become far harsher now
that they have deprived the regime of the near-monopoly of terror it enjoyed in
the conflict's early months; this has lost them support among some Syrians with
no love for the regime.
These leave three
other issues out of consideration. First, any western military action will
provoke Tehran into increasing its support of Damascus (which Baghdad may
facilitate). Second, the fall of Assad's regime may turn out to be a prolonged
process involving even greater loss of innocent life. Third, the wider impact
of yet another western intervention in the Middle East may be disastrous.
A different endgame The predicament over
Syria remains appalling.. There is, though, one possibility that could avert
the worst outcomes: a decision by President Obama's administration to make a
very strong effort to achieve negotiated regime
change. The west, to put it bluntly, is not in a position to
dictate what form Syria's evolving governance might take. It has to recognise
that this must principally be decided within Syria – but that the acquiescence
of other
states in the process will be essential: Russia and Iran, but also Turkey and
Egypt.
The lone hopeful element in this scenario is
that Obama's re-election gives him
room for action. Over Syria – as over Iran and Israel-Palestine–
he could in principle follow a more considered approach, avoid the risks of
escalating conflict, and seek the best possible solution available
in difficult circumstances. Where Damascus is concerned, there is still a
chance of some kind of arranged regime change – very tough though it would be
to reach. Will that chance be taken? The answer lies mainly in Washington, but
not a little too in Moscow and Tehran, and in Ankara and Cairo. The fate of
Syria, and more than Syria, is in the balance. [Abridged]
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/dec/06/syria-last-chance-diplomacy
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